TRADE DETAILS
Padres receive: RHP Dylan Cease
White Sox receive: RHP Drew Thorpe (MLB Pipeline’s No. 85 prospect; SD No. 5), OF Samuel Zavala (SD No. 7), RHP Jairo Iriarte (SD No. 8), RHP Steven Wilson
Love this deal consummated yesterday for the San Diego Padres. AJ Preller used the top pitching prospect he didn’t like in the Juan Soto deal (Drew Thorpe) as a primary trade chip to acquire a front-of-the-rotation starter. RHP Dylan Cease is not as good as Corbin Burnes, but the Padres get two years of affordable team control without surrendering their top prospects.
Padres gave up three prospects and a reliever in the deal: RHP Drew Thorpe, a high floor soft-tossing top 100 pitcher with a 3rd starter ceiling; RHP Jairo Iriarte, a riskier high-ceiling top 100 pitcher and the key to this deal for the White Sox; OF Samuel Zavala, a 19yo lottery ticket; RHP Steven Wilson, a decent cheap reliever. If you are interested in winning, you would rather have Dylan Cease than what the Padres gave up.
This keeps the Padres competitive AND under the luxury tax, so they can reset after splurging and coming up snake eyes. Teams pay huge penalty amounts for being over certain tiers of payroll, and it’s difficult to get back under without tearing a team apart. For example, in 2020 the Red Sox traded RF Mookie Betts to the Dodgers and dumped LHP David Price as part of the deal. Red Sox ownership was no longer willing to pay the penalty for being over the payroll threshold, especially for a team that didn’t win. Red Sox haven’t been competitive since and currently are a mess.
Splurging in free agency sure ain’t what it used to be. Teams lose multiple draft choices and/or international draft money for signing free agents that rejected qualifying offers, especially when the signing team is over certain team-payroll tiers. That’s why the Yankees are locked-in with ace RHP Gerrit Cole now on the IL for ~3 months. GM Brian Cashman can’t sign LHP Blake Snell even though they desperately need him after losing out on Cease. The Yankees luxury tax on any Blake Snell contract would be 110%, meaning if they offer him $30M/year, the Yankees must also pay MLB another $33M in tax penalty. Plus, they lose their 2nd & 5th round amateur draft picks in the 2024 & international draft money [!].
That hurts, and it’s what happens when you spend yourself into a corner. What really hurts the Yankees is the Padres using trade capital (Drew Thorpe) from the Juan Soto deal to get Cease. If the NYY pitching staff falls apart, Soto is long gone after 2024. Padres dumped Juan Soto to the Yankees (because they had to) and acquired three pitchers who are going to fill out their 2024 rotation in Micheal King, Jhony Brito & Randy Vásquez. C Kyle Higashioka for CF Trent Grisham was an even swap based on the Padres need for a reliable veteran catcher; and Drew Thorpe reduced the Padres organizational cost of acquiring Dylan Cease to flame-throwing pitching prospect Jairo Iriarte.
The DSG bankruptcy in 2023 cost the Padres an estimated $60-80M in TV revenue, and caused them to operate at a financial loss of over $50M for the season. The death of majority owner Peter Seidler after last season reset the Padres onto a ‘get younger & cheaper’ trajectory. Padres GM grade: A+
The Padres are replacing veterans they lost with younger players, especially on the pitching side. The only opening day hole that remains is LF after trading Juan Soto, the rest they are filling internally. They even filled their manager vacancy internally, which I like.
Several years ago the Padres had the consensus ‘best farm system’ in baseball, but only Fernando Tatis Jr remains from that crop. The rest of those prospects were traded and most disappointed. This time around the Padres have drafted better & improved their player development, yielding a farm system that can feed more of its own talent onto their big league roster instead of becoming exclusively trade chips. It’s all about developing young talent in a way that helps a team win. It helps there is an organizational foundation now, because when AJ Preller arrived in San Diego there was little-to-nothing.
Trading Juan Soto to the Yankees helps the Padres because they won’t have the “will Soto resign” questions all season which was a distraction for the team in 2023. The Yankees get that headache in 2024. LHP Blake Snell was reportedly offered a 6-year deal at $28M/year by the Yankees in December, but refused it on the advice of his agent Scott Boras. Yankees then pivoted to RHP Marcus Stroman on a shorter deal.
Yankees, Giants, Angels & Rangers have been reported as being interested in the reigning NL Cy Young Award winner, but no team wants to give up draft picks and international pool money for him on a short-term free agent deal, and no team will match the Yankees earlier offer for Snell. That’s how a professional athlete overplays his hand in looking for the big payday while not understanding the market and letting greed go to his head.
Those teams I listed as being in on Snell are it. Padres, Cubs, Mets, Red Sox, Dodgers are all taking a pass. No other teams are interested because 1) too expensive in dollars/win, and/or 2) too costly in draft capital. For what it costs in draft capital, you have to get at least a 4-year deal on Blake Snell. Maybe $20M/year at this point. Snell says he prefers the Angels. Rangers, Giants (& Yankees) need him more. Significant risk he busts.
If Blake Snell really wants to be an Angel, then he shouldn’t have retained Scott Boras (pic above) as his agent. Boras clients (Juan Soto, etc) go where the money is highest. I feel like Blake Snell is yet another case of an elite-level athlete who is very confused and it’s costing him dearly. At this point, he needs to think outside the box, possibly a deferred money deal like Shohei Ohtani with the Dodgers.
As a bookend, this is the first significant trade AJ Preller has made with the White Sox since he dumped RHP James Shields in 2016, eating half his remaining contract to get a prospect to go with injured LHP Erik Johnson. AJ Preller selected a recent international signee, not yet ranked on any organizational prospect list– Fernando Tatis, Jr and the White Sox agreed to it. Before long ESPN was asking, “Who is Fernando Tatis, Jr?” and that was the LAST time an old-school MLB franchise got robbed of a generational prospect. So it is fitting that the White Sox firesale from this failed era ends with AJ Preller getting just what he needs at a price he likes.
This winter I read a series of articles on Fangraphs written by their prospect guru Eric Longenhagen. For the record, I respect his method & scouting reports for young players whom I can’t see personally and don’t have time (or inclination) to research. One thing Eric Longenhagen admitted (that I very much agree with) is that player/prospect evaluation in the minors has taken a quantum leap in the last 5-10 years. It used to be so much guesswork and biased opinions of old school scouts, where now there is more raw data & video out there that can be analyzed & used.
This is good because it used to be that organizations such as the Yankees, Red Sox & Dodgers could hype their latest top prospects on TV and thus fool rival GMs into thinking they were better than they actually were. Today, input from analytic understanding fans on social media & blog sites won’t allow that crap to gain traction.
Prospect rankings are much more of a science now, with the clear understanding that a few organizations have outstanding farm systems, while most will be mediocre, spotty, or weak. Top prospects across organizations aren’t equal and depth is just as important in terms of winning. Top talent is identified more readily in this ‘stathead fan’ era, but sleepers still do exist, and that’s a GM focal point in most player-for-prospects deals.
It’s not that teams are less willing to trade prospects today, it’s teams valuing their prospects more correctly (more highly) than in the past. It started for real when the 2016-17 hot stove season froze out non-superstar free agents, and the analytic ‘Moneyball’ philosophy was proven correct. Young players were more highly valued by most GMs by then, and so the market for veteran free agents cratered. Guys who thought they were getting 4/$80M were settling for 2/$16M or 1/$8M. Free agents who refused qualifying offers were shunned by a majority of teams that valued draft picks & young prospects above expensive veterans.
There was huge player anger at MLBPA leader Tony Clark in spring training 2017 for him signing CBA’s (since 2003 when tax thresholds were first set) that allowed a de facto salary cap on free agents through a Competitive Balance Tax (CBT) on team payrolls by MLB. A competitive balance or luxury tax was first levied upon the five highest-payroll teams from 1997 to 1999, in response to Florida Marlins ownership buying a World Series in 1997 and then selling off the team before Opening Day 1998. That was a wild card team that got hot in October and so their title wasn’t respected by many baseball purists.
In the 2000’s a system was put in place to ensure the biggest spenders would eventually be reigned in by CBT penalties, while the pretenders could collect MLB revenue sharing and be profitable with 90-100 losses per season. Commissioner (and former Brewers owner) Bud Selig was hailed as a genius for this and installed into the HoF for keep the peace among the owners during this boom period in MLB revenue due to satellite TV & internet streaming.
What the old system of MLB free agency (1977- 2002) always relied upon was another willing spender. Today, at least a third of MLB franchises are in survival mode. The A’s don’t have a home, Marlins never draw, Rockies can’t develop pitchers at high altitude, Brewers, Pirates, Reds, White Sox, Tigers, Royals have cheap owners… When a top talent goes on the market, it’s always the same teams getting the cream. The smartest teams budget & plan for it.
The Rays are the best at developing and dealing their young talent. Rays say they can’t afford to pay top arbitration salary, so they deal early and look for sleepers in other systems they’ve scouted. They are the best at the modern Moneyball game. Everybody respects them, but they never quite have enough in October. The last homegrown ‘small-market’ team that won it all was the Royals in 2015. That was less than ten years ago and yet that era of baseball seems a lifetime away.
It’s fear that drives many of these decisions. Fear of being wrong and crucified in the media & on social media. Fear of losing your job. GMs who operate based on fear are doomed. You can’t win like that. It’s the boldest and most ruthless organizations that are able to exploit the fears of those who are just happy to survive. In between the haves and have-nots, there are a few interesting teams like the Rays, Orioles & Diamondbacks who know what they are doing. It makes this unpredictable game more predictable than ever in terms of who will win in 2024. Is that progress? It depends on who you ask.
Tue 19 Mar 2024 10:30 AM CDT
MLB sources now report that LHP Blake Snell is about to sign a 2-year contract worth $62M, with a player opt-out after 2024. Blake Snell rejected a QO from the Padres, so the Giants will lose their third-round draft pick in 2024, as well as $500,000 from their international bonus pool for the upcoming signing period. San Francisco had already forfeited its second-round pick (and international pool $) after signing 3B Matt Chapman, who declined a qualifying offer from the Blue Jays.
For the Giants, this is an expensive price to pay for what could be one year of Blake Snell. If Snell pitches well in 2024, he can re-enter the free agent market and try his luck again, without a QO tag attached to him. If Snell pitches poorly this year, he will pick up his (overpriced) 2025 option. That $31M option for 2025 makes Blake Snell tougher to trade at the Aug 1 deadline if things fall apart for the Giants in 2024. They would have to eat significant contract to deal him for any prospect value in return. Deals that are so costly, and lock a franchise in like this, are extremely risky. That’s why most teams stayed away.
Blake Snell didn’t get the long-term deal he was seeking because he played his cards poorly, and/or he was never serious about joining the Yankees. He didn’t wind up with the Angels either, which was his preferred destination. Most MLB players who are fortunate enough to reach free agency, only get one chance to negotiate a deal of a lifetime and Blake Snell blew it with Scott Boras as his agent.
The only way the Giants can win this deal is if Blake Snell pitches great and leads them on a deep post-season run. Every other scenario pans out with the Giants losing value & paying the price. When you do risk assessment as a GM, this screams, “DON’T DO IT”, but teams can’t help themselves. They have billionaire owners who want to win, pushing the front office to foolishly go for it when it’s a bad risk, which if it fails will set the organization back. That’s what Scott Boras & MLBPA executives have always counted on, but it’s getting harder to pull off. That’s the current dynamic in MLB.
Final thoughts: If QO free agents can’t find the long-term deal they are seeking, the next-best option is to take a 1-year deal for maximum money with a player option for a second year in case they have a bad season or get hurt. Teams have WAR/$ projections, injury risk analysis, etc, for every MLB player, so coveted players really don’t need an agent to represent them. Players simply need to understand their true value– warts and all (particularly the QO tag)– to determine what the market is and what they can get.
Scott Boras & the MLBPA executives represent the star players (& now top prospects) of MLB. The young players & non-star players are the majority who sacrifice themselves the most for these superstar salaries & MLB owner profits. Most MLB players are well-underpaid for their first 6 years, and since 2017-18 they have been squeezed in free agency, as it is well understood that (in most cases) veterans can be adequately replaced with younger cheaper players. This is how MLB free agent salaries have been driven down for the majority of the players, while a thin layer of superstars get mega-deal$.
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