I loved Ken Griffey with the Big Red Machine, so I naturally loveloved CF Ken Griffey, Jr.
Junior was drafted #1 overall by the hapless Seattle Mariners in 1989, and went straight to the majors, at age 19. He possessed one of the sweetest lefty swings you will ever see, with unbelievable natural power. He played centerfield at the level of Willie Mays with his range, superior arm strength (with accuracy), and amazing glovework– all of which he made look easy. Affably easygoing, he was groomed in a MLB dugout (as a bat boy), and was pretty much the perfect player for all his years (11) in Seattle.
Mike Piazza was comparable in career value to Carlton Fisk or Yogi Berra– two all-time great catchers.
So understand that Ken Griffey, Jr. & Mike Piazza are NOT the standard for the HoF; they are inner circle, all-time greats.
So how can Ken Griffey, Jr. & Mike Piazza be the only players elected on this all-time talented ballot? [1]
These are the players on this year’s ballot, and they’ll beat just about any HoF team you could put together– from any era:
C Mike Piazza
1B Jeff Bagwell
2B Jeff Kent
SS Alan Trammell
3B Gary Sheffield
LF Barry Bonds
CF Ken Griffey, Jr.
RF Tim Raines
DH Edgar Martinez
SP Roger Clemens, Mike Mussina, Curt Schilling
RP Trevor Hoffman, Billy Wagner
Notice I left off 1B Mark McGwire & RF Sammy Sosa, because I do think they went too far with PEDs. There needs to be a line, and that’s it to me.
Barry Bonds received 44.3% of the vote, in his 5th year of eligibility. He was the greatest player ever, and if you don’t recognize that (or exclude him for joining in on what so many others had already been doing), then you’re a hater. He was already a HoFer. Character? Please, this is the MLB HoF, with Cap Anson & Ty Cobb.
The 55.7% who (once again) ignored Bonds should lose their voting privilege, because obviously they know nothing about baseball.
Voters who insist on a PED-free HoF are hypocrites for not selecting Mike Mussina, Edgar Martinez, Tim Raines, etc…
Any voter that didn’t have 10 players (the maximum number allowed) on their ballot, is a bum sportswriter. [2]
Baseball fans deserve to see ALL the HoF ballots with their public justifications, because the entire process is broken, with a lack of transparency & fan input.
The San Diego Padres have a strong military fanbase, and I love reading soldiers’ comments online, which typically go something like this:
“I’m in the Marines, and this team is what we call FUBAR’d…, this is what’s wrong…., this is what needs to be done…. BOOYAH!!!”
Rarely are the merits of these posts criticized or debated, and the poster often disappears for awhile; all of which I find fascinating.
It’s a very open & democratic forum, and generally laid-back with Padres fans. It’s a relief from being a Rays fan, having to deal with all the Red Sox/Yankees hyper-competitiveness. Here’s what I had to say about the Pads in their MLB forum this fall:
10-29-15: Padres name D-backs’ Green manager
Andy Green is energetic, has managerial experience in the minors, embraces sabermetirics, and is well-respected in the Diamondbacks organization. The San Diego Padres need to rebuild, so I like this hire. [posted on Facebook]
11-02-15: Padres move quickly to bring back Balsley
I too am relieved that Darren Balsley is staying. I wasn’t sure he’d stay with this mess in SD, but this is his home. It appears the Nationals are even worse off in their management situation with the Black/Baker fiasco. Balsley will help rebuild this pitching staff– he’s the best as so many have already pointed out. The fan support in this forum surely helped.
11-13-15: Kennedy, Upton reject qualifying offers
A.J. Preller wins another one for San Diego this week– every little bit helps. Kennedy isn’t worth more than $10/year; he & agent Scott Boras are banking on an overpay deal. We’ll see…
Deal Matt Kemp who had decent numbers in 2015, but needs to be in the AL where he can DH. Shields & BJ Upton are surely on the block too, but Kemp is the priority. So far, so good for Padres fans, the Kimbrel deal is the right idea. Keep adding depth to the farm system, and work on player development; that’s how the Royals, Astros & Cubs did it. No one really knows how any of these prospects are going to pan out. Smart GM’s look for prospects with high upside, and grab as many as they can get.
Note: Teams don’t keep their compensation pick if they re-sign their free agent. They would also have to forfeit the pick should they sign another qualifying free agent and not have a first-round pick to give up (either because they pick in the top 10, or because they sign more than one qualifying free agent and have previously surrendered their first-round selection).
These compensation picks currently sit at # 31 & #32. If the Padres don’t sign a qualifying-offer FA this off-season, these picks will end up in the low 20’s or high teens. They already have the #8 pick, so this will immediately add talent to a depleted system if Preller & Co. make good selections in the June draft. The Padres have historically had a terrible farm system, and this is how you fix it.
Preller has made his share of mistakes in his first year on the job, most noticeably the Matt Kemp trade. However he also stole Wil Myers, who can be a franchise player if kept healthy. Franchise players don’t grow on trees, and this organization is still reeling from losing Adrian Gonzalez, and then giving away Anthony Rizzo. Preller cleaned house and got rid of many assets that were largely fungible. Preller is obviously a stat guy, and his blind spot seems to be baseball tactics and in-game management. He needs to get at least one lefty in the rotation, an adequate (affordable) shortstop, and another LOOGY (Left-Handed One Out Guy) in the pen, so his new manager isn’t handcuffed like Black & Murph were in 2015.
In response to another fan on the board who disagreed with SD trading Trea Turner & Joe Ross for Wil Myers:
How about “acquired Wil Myers? For a 22-YO 2B who ‘hit’ .225/.295/.325 with the Nats in 2015 & a 22-YO potential 2/3 starter in Ross. 24-YO Myers has superstar upside, but he obviously has to stay healthy. His wrist injuries began in Tampa from diving for balls on their artificial turf. Diving for balls in CF last year didn’t help, which was Preller’s fault as much as Myers’. He’s a corner outfielder & stud prospect. It was a great trade for the Padres, and it’s been overlooked because the 2015 Padres were so badly put together.
How’d I do on the rest?
11-20-15: Padres announce Spring Training schedule
Below are the remaining off-season dates of which Padres fans should be aware. The Rule 5 draft is next, and it could be an opportunity for Preller to snag a prospect– depending on the talent available and their roster situation in 2016.
Rule 5 footnote: Organizations may also draft players from AA or lower to play for their AAA affiliates for $12,000; and may draft players from A teams or lower to play for their AA affiliates for $4,000. Most 12/4K picks never approach becoming MLB players, but serve as organizational filler which has value in that they help true prospects develop quicker, and with more success.
Pete Rose (24 seasons): .303/.375/.409, w/ 198 SB, 149 CS; Tim Raines (23 seasons): .294/.385/.425, w/ 808 SB, 146 CS. Rock was more valuable, and it’s a joke he isn’t in the HoF. Rose should obviously be in too, but that’s another discussion…
11-23-15: Open-minded Green embraces defensive shifts
“He’s open to any idea that’s going to help a team, help an organization get better,” Preller said. “He’s not looking at any idea or a particular statistic as being gospel. I think that’s something we share. You present an idea, he wants to hear it and then he wants to see how it works.”
The GM & manager are communicating, and on the same page. This already makes the Padres better than last season.
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Andy Green has managed in the minors, so he presumably knows how a roster needs to be constructed in order to win. Green needs to be in agreement with A.J. Preller, and vise-versa. That isn’t interfering, it’s called attempting to understand one another so they both can do a better job.
Old-school vs sabermetrics is a misnomer. Statistical analysis is meant to illuminate parts of the game that were traditionally overlooked or had gotten lost. Run production & run prevention are thought of much differently today, than they were 20 years ago. If you fall behind, you get left behind.
Moneyball critics always point to the fact the Oakland A’s under GM Billy Beane have never won (or even reached) the World Series. All that proves is that you need SOME payroll investment from ownership, in order to win it. The TB Rays were the same way, and it was maddening to root for them when team owner Stuart Sternberg didn’t care to invest. Many Rays fans (such as myself) quit the day they traded David Price, and not coincidentally GM Andrew Friedman & Joe Maddon left soon after.
Stats GM Theo Epstein joined the Red Sox in November 2003, and ended their Curse in less than a year, building a mini-dynasty in the process. That’s what happens when you combine a more-than-adequate payroll with moneyball. Ask any true blue Brew Crew fan, “Which do you want: beer or brats?” and they will ALL correctly answer, “Both!” It’s the same way with old-school & sabermetrics.
11-20-15: Report: McGwire in talks for Padres’ bench coach job
Mark McGwire would be an inspired selection for bench coach. He was a power hitter who knew the strike zone. See how much more valuable he is, over a contemporary 1B who didn’t control it as well:
Mark McGwire (16 seasons) .263/.394/.588 1626 H 1317 BB
Cecil Fielder (13 seasons) .255/.345/.482 1313 H 693 BB
They both could mash, and PEDs surely inflated McGwire’s .588 SLG%, but the ability to take a walk is a baseball skill which big Cecil lacked– hurting his value.
It’s Mac’s career .394 OBP that truly separates him as a HoF-level performer.
Mark McGwire acted honorably during the PED show trials of 2005, by quite correctly refusing to answer whether or not he had ever used PEDs– as any answer would have put him in legal jeopardy. He told the committee, “I will use whatever influence and popularity that I have to discourage young athletes from taking any drug that is not recommended by a doctor. What I will not do, however, is participate in naming names and implicating my friends and teammates.”
None of the players were granted immunity in exchange for testimony, which would have allowed them to speak freely. Instead of dealing with the public health crisis of PED usage in young athletes, the congressional hearing cynically entitled “Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime” was an exercise in bipartisan political grandstanding. Rafael Palmiero (lying then finger pointing) & Sammy Sosa (pretending he didn’t understand English) truly disgraced themselves; but no one topped Bud Selig. The commissioner of the Steroid Era, in a snivelling & gutless performance, repeatedly claimed “no knowledge” or was “unable to recall” over a decade’s worth of overwhelming evidence of widespread PED use in MLB. More than anyone else, Allan Huber “Bud” Selig is responsible for MLB’s PED era, which still persists today.
Mark McGwire confessed his steroid use in 2010, with contrition. He is a proud, yet humble man who burns for redemption. New manager Andy Green & hitting coach Alan Zinter are inexperienced at the MLB level, which can be a problem with veteran players. Big Mac’s presence in the dugout & around the hitting cage would be an asset for the Padres, commanding respect from the players, while not challenging Green’s authority. I believe if he is given a fair chance, he will act with integrity & work his butt off to help the Padres achieve their goal of finally winning a World Series. That’s all a fan can ask for.
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Open Letter on the Padres from an outsider’s perspective:
An argument can be made, that the only season the Padres had a true ace was in 1998. That was the only season the Padres had Kevin Brown, and unfortunately they ran into one of the best teams ever in the World Series. Jake Peavy had four seasons of ace-level pitching in San Diego, and is the best career starting pitcher the franchise has ever had. Who is #2? It’s a toss-up between Andy Benes and Andy Ashby.
The franchise all-time MVP pitcher, measured by WAR is closer Trevor Hoffman. The Padres have been in existence since 1969 and their franchise 5-man rotation leaders by IP is: Eric (Win, Lose or) Show, Randy Jones, Peavy, Ed Whitson and Benes; which clearly reveals an Achilles heel that has existed since inception. The Padres must develop (and retain) better starting pitching, or it will never win a World Series.
Another organizational Achilles heel is their failure to recognize the talent within. Consider these players: Dave Winfield (left as FA), Ozzie Smith (traded after 4 seasons), and Roberto Alomar (about to turn 23, and by far the best player in that deal). In 1992 young 3B Gary Sheffield was handed to the Padres by Selig’s Brewers. He became an overnight star, then was shipped to the Marlins who won the WS with him in 1997. San Diego got Trevor Hoffman in the deal, but Sheffield (22 seasons, .292/.393/.514) was worth much more, PED arguments aside. Hoffman is a HoFer because you need a closer, but his overall value is limited by his 1098.1 career IP. For comparison, Tom Glavine (Braves) had 4413.1 IP. More game time means more value towards winning.
Dealing 1B Adrian Gonzalez was another deathblow to a Padres competitive window. He would have been Señor Padre at the end of his HoF career, if they had kept him. Organizations typically don’t recover from that, especially when they squander the trade’s centerpiece by sending 1B prospect Anthony Rizzo to the Cubs for Andrew Cashner. Cash definitely has good stuff, with 2/3 upside if he can figure it out & stay healthy, but who knows how good Rizzo will be? He was age 25, hitting .278/.387/.512 in 701 PA in 2015.
Only RF Tony Gwynn (20 seasons: .338/.388/.459) and Trevor Hoffman (18 seasons: 2.87 ERA) stand out as HoF-level career Padres, and that’s just not enough to win consistently in 47 seasons.
This is the legacy new GM A.J. Preller inherits, so long-time fans (who are understandably frustrated from decades of incompetence) need to cut him some slack. He’s had some missteps, but he’s also proven a quick study. Let’s face it, this entire organization needed an enema. Much detritus has been flushed as the Padres start anew, hopefully with better planning, scouting, coaching, and eventually players. A winning philosophy combines the best of ALL baseball thinking, as this game is too vast to ignore either its historical lessons or its recent innovations.
As far as team president Mike Dee and owner Ron Fowler go, their job is to provide Preller with the necessary payroll, while staying out of the day-to-day operations. The mantra with GM Andrew Friedman while he was in TB was always “trust in the process,” meaning if you are doing things correctly you will eventually see good results. The Rays were a moneyball franchise that never won it all, because they were hamstrung by ownership– competing short-stacked in the AL East, always forced to play for future seasons. “Pile up enough tomorrows and you’ll end up with a bunch of empty yesterdays,” said Robert Preston in The Music Man (1962).
In this era, a MLB team needs a payroll of at least $100-120 million to win it all. Ownership supplies the money, so obviously it is let in on plan, but it shouldn’t be allowed to meddle. If Preller eventually needs a boost in payroll to acquire a player who will put the Padres over the top (as the KC Royals did in 2015 by acquiring Johnny Cueto at the trade deadline), then ownership is obliged to step up. Mike Dee’s job from a baseball standpoint is simply to hire & fire the GM. As team president, his job should mostly focus on revenue acquisition from media, ticket sales, promotions, etc… A winning organization make his job easier.
Padres fans need to be patient, and die-hards understand this all-too-well. It’s a long off-season to go, but don’t have any winning expectations for the Padres until 2018, at the earliest. Obviously things will change as players get traded, new prospects develop, etc… All we can do as fans is understand the process, and speak our voices in forums such as these. Successes need to be understood objectively, and are also the best opportunity for fans to express their emotions. Organizational failures should be pointed out and discussed analytically and rationally, avoiding anger & hysterics– which don’t help. It also doesn’t help to list random, useless stats as an argument. All non-pitchers can be precisely measured using the triple slash stats, AVG/OBP/SLG. If it is a season comparison, provide plate appearances & player age; for careers, provide the number of seasons played and defensive position. Defense is now accurately determined, with advanced metrics replacing traditional errors, put-outs and assists. Pitchers are accurately valued using ERA, IP and K/BB ratios– season & career.
All this is a reasonable fan contract. The more Padres fans get on board with this program, the easier it is for GM A.J. Preller to do his job. The STL Cardinals are a great example of an organization that has everyone in sync, from ownership down to the bat boys/ball girls. Their organization & fans understand when to let an old star go (Albert Pujols), and who to retain (Matt Holliday). They develop their own position players and pitchers. That’s why they are consistently competitive, and win their share of World Series. If this is indeed the model Preller is trying to build, then it deserves fan support.
I don’t have an official vote, but I do have an official opinion.
My 2016 HoF Ballot— Newbies: Ken Griffey Jr. (Mariners), Trevor Hoffman (Padres) and Billy Wagner (Astros). Holdovers: Tim Raines (Expos), Barry Bonds (Pirates), Roger Clemens (Red Sox), Mike Piazza (Dodgers), Jeff Bagwell (Astros), Edgar Martinez (Mariners) and Mike Mussina (Orioles). Extra selection because it’s needed here: Curt Schilling (Phillies).
Alan Trammell, Jeff Kent, Gary Sheffield, and Larry Walker all deserve serious consideration.
Players now only get 10 years on the ballot, with grandfather exemptions for Lee Smith (14th) & Trammell (15th). Raines is in his 9th year.
How do guys like Randy Winn & David Eckstein even get on the ballot?
The HoF selection process is totally FUBAR’d, so I wouldn’t be surprised if Hoffman & Wagner don’t get in this year.
Tim Raines (23 seasons) .294/.385/.425, w/ 808 SB, 146 CS Pete Rose (24 seasons) .303/.375/.409, w/ 198 SB, 149 CS
As for Sosa, McGwire, etc., I’ve already discussed my thoughts on the steroid era & the HoF, and they haven’t changed.
It is extremely narrow-minded & unfair to blame only the players for the PED-era. Tony La Russa was part of the 2014 HoF class, and deservingly so; but everyone seems to ignore the fact that he was the manager of the Oakland A’s featuring Jose Canseco & Mark McGwire. Canseco is universally acknowledged as the player who brought steroids into MLB, and McGwire was his first protégé. [1] La Russa has a law degree and is very intelligent, so he certainly knew what was going on. Why no shame or HoF ban on La Russa?
Same goes for all the other managers, coaches & training staff, the GM’s, the owners & their commissioner. What about agents who encourage their clients to juice in order to produce better numbers, which translates into more $$$? Nothing tops the hypocrisy of the media & the ‘fans’ who today heap scorn at select star players, for making them dupes; all while ignoring their own failure to investigate and ask questions. All this aided & abetted MLB PED usage, so claiming ignorance rings false; as steroids had been rampant in Olympic competition & the NFL for decades, so it wasn’t anything new to sports.
The point is: all the hits, home runs, strikeouts, wins & championships have been celebrated, and count forever in MLB history. The feats of the PED-players indelibly leave their mark in the record books and there is no expunging them. Sports fans need to absorb the valuable lessons of this tainted epoch, which include: the limits of chemical science, ethics, and the all-powerful corrupting influence of money. If baseball fans can get to this, then they may actually (one day) get a HoF which represents its best players.
Last remark on Pete Rose: He’s paid his dues, make him eligible & he’s in. No use honoring dead heroes. Old-guard MLB elite stiffed a deserving & long-suffering Ron Santo (Cubs) as he was dying of diabetes, and it was despicable. Pete Rose (Reds) is getting old…
On top of this list are egomaniac owners, with way more money than brains:
Where you REALLY don’t want to be on this chart is near the top & out of the post-season– those team’s CEO’s & GM’s all deserve scrutiny.
MLB teams spent an average of $1,573,000 per win in 2015. In today’s free agent market, teams pay an average of $6M/win. Teams determine player value by calculating the number of wins a player will add above replacement level (WAR), using a blend of scouting and advanced metrics. A championship-level player at any position is 2-3 WAR, an all-star is 4-6 WAR, and a MVP is 8-10 WAR. Finding & signing bargains, while minimizing mistakes, is how you win as a GM.
All players need to be objectively valued, starting with the most important baseball skill– hitting. Hitting is best measured using the triple slash stats of AVG/OBP/SLG which gives a true measure of a hitter’s ability. OBP is life in baseball. It is the most important measure of a hitter’s value, carrying around three times the weight of SLG, which is second in importance. AVG is prone to severe fluctuations, even from season to season, and doesn’t measure the batter’s ability to take a walk– a critical hitting skill.
For reference, 2015 MLB triple slash averages for all players was .254/.317/.405.
Q: What is a batter is trying to do at the plate? A: Create runs. He does this by: 1) not making outs, and 2) hitting for power.
Productive outs are WAY over-rated in most situations. Sacrifice bunts give the other team an out, which is generally bad in terms of winning. Base stealing is also over-hyped, as caught stealing hurts– especially in this modern power-hitting era. Team SB% needs to be >75% to be effective towards winning.
A hitter’s value always needs to be understood in the context of the defensive position he plays. Catcher, shortstop, centerfield, and second base are critical & difficult defensive positions, which must be played competently for a pitching staff to be successful & stay healthy. Power & run production is usually expected from the less-demanding defensive positions: first base, corner outfielders, and third base. Of course, DH has always been about power in the AL, since 1973.
Pitching, as related to winning, is also about power. Pitchers with high K/9 and low BB/9 have the low ERA’s. Strikeout pitchers handle the best hitters with their stuff, and cover up for poor defense. The value of true-ace pitching in the post-season is exponentially higher than in the regular season.
Relief pitching has only the fraction of the value of starting pitching. Most organizations still overpay on closers and set-up relievers. Smart organizations stockpile power arms, then convert them to relievers if they fail as starters, in order to keep payroll costs down.
Defense was the final baseball frontier to be conquered by sabermetrics, begrudgingly earning respect from the old-timers. With the advent of digital video technology in the 2000’s, each player is now more accurately measured for their true defensive value. As recently as the 1990’s, assists, put outs, and errors were the only stats for individual defense; making Gold Glove awards (and any other opinions on defensive ability) highly subjective. Now, Zone Ratings, etc… use statistical analysis to objectify range, accuracy, arm strength, and competence at all positions.
As productive players at premium defensive positions get older, their defensive skills erode necessitating their being moved to easier spots, usually 1B or DH. Baseball history proves that it is nearly impossible to move a major-league player up the defensive spectrum, which runs C-SS-2B-CF-3B-RF-LF-1B-DH.
All this new data gives savvy GM’s (with a competitive payroll) the ability to budget their ball club, from its rebuilding to World Series champion. This is exactly how in 2015, the Houston Astros & Chicago Cubs rose from the ashes into the post-season. The St. Louis Cardinals are an example of an organization that is always competitively-funded & well-run from top to bottom.
Pennants & WS championships are won in the off-season. The deals a general manager makes through trades, free agent signings, and Rule 5 draft acquisitions shape the roster for the field manager. Most big league skippers will manage their talent equally well; and even the best, such as Joe Maddon can only add a few wins to a season’s total. The field manager’s primary value is in the post-season where game-management skills win & lose pennants. That’s why rebuilding organizations punt on experience and often give the manager job to a rookie at minimum salary– because they aren’t too worried about the post-season.
Generally, you need a good manager to win it all, and having a great one really helps. The most infamous example of an incompetent manager winning the World Series was in 2001, when Arizona Diamondbacks skipper Bob Brenly so horribly mismanaged his 2 HOF aces– Randy Johnson and Curt Schilling; along with his bullpen to the point where HOF NY Yankee closer Mariano Rivera was pitching in the bottom of the 9th of Game 7 with a one-run lead. A last-gasp rally started by Mark Grace, and aided by a Rivera throwing error, saved the Diamondbacks from eternal ridicule.
BTW, the Diamondbacks/Yankees 2001 was (IMO) the greatest World Series in the history of the game.
The most important GM questions of each off-season are: What is the payroll budget and where is this organization on the win curve? Understanding where a team is on its win curve determines spending priorities. Is this a team ready to win it all, or does it need to keep building, or rebuild? With an answer fairly determined, spending is then balanced accordingly on MLB payroll and draft/player development. Teams with no shot at winning (<75 wins projected) are well-advised to dump veteran payroll, in order to re-invest in prospects, the draft, and young international free agents.
Looking at basic team numbers can reveal much about where an organization sits on the win curve. Today with two Wild Cards, a team can virtually guarantee a playoff birth with 92-94 wins. Runs Scored (RS) & Runs Allowed (RA) objectify won/loss record, through Pythagorean projections. Intelligent GM’s can look at their roster before the season and use advanced metrics to estimate RS/RA, in order to approximate their team’s final W/L record.
Proof of this is in hindsight too. For instance, in 2015, the NY Mets were 90-72 scoring 683 runs and allowing 613, projecting to an 89-73 record. Most teams fall near their RS/RA projection, but not all. Sometimes teams can be lucky or unlucky in one-run games and/or extra innings– usually these contests are split around 50/50. This can distort a team’s final record, and reflect a false picture of their true talent.
An example of this were the 2015 Oakland A’s, who were 68-94, yet they were only outscored by 35 runs on the season (694-729). OAK’s Pythagorean projection was 77-85, but a 19-35 record in one-run games, the worst winning % in MLB, sunk their season. The good news for A’s fans is that OAK probably isn’t as bad as their 2015 record, and their Moneyball GM Billy Beane knows it.
Other GM’s don’t understand this so well, and they are usually found in organizations that perennially miss the post-season. Managers are hired and fired more often, and with more fanfare. Field managers probably receive too much of the credit & blame for winning & losing, while the GM’s off-season moves have much more impact on a team’s performance & final result.
Fans who don’t know their team’s general manger have very little clue as to why their team succeeds or not. For franchises that continually lose, this is likely the way it will continue to be, until their fans take a closer (and more serious) look at the business of baseball.
This team was going to be a story in MLB in 2015, with all the off-season dealings and free agent signings by newly-hired GM A.J. Preller. Opening Day payroll was increased to $108 million (a record expenditure for the franchise), and everyone in the organization from owner (beer distribution magnate) Ron Fowler to CEO Mike Dee was optimistic about the Padres chances of making the post-season.
San Diego Padres CEO Mike Dee
In reality, it was all over by July or August, depending on one’s level of sobriety. The 2015 San Diego Padres will go down as one of the most ill-conceived teams in modern baseball history. As of this publication, they are 67-77, 4th in the NL West; 16 GB in their division and the wild card. Mercifully, only three weeks remain in the season, with their playoff elimination # now well into single digits.
The 2015 Padres were a tantalizingly streaky team early; one that wins five, then drops six on a whim. The Padres now rank: 28th AVG at .244; 30th (last) in OBP at .299; and 26th in SLG at .387. Despite playing half their games in an extreme pitching park, the Pads are no better than 20th in team ERA. Their pitchers are tied for 4th (w/ TB) in K’s, but they’ve allowed the 4th-most walks. Their Defensive Efficiency Rating (DER) is .687, ranking 20th. Petco Park has one of the roomiest outfields in MLB, so poor defense hurts even more there than in a bandbox.
A.J. Preller Padres GM
The entire starting rotation was right-handed, allowing opposing mangers to stack a lefty lineup, day after day. This extreme right-handedness included relief pitching– until Marc Rzepczynski was acquired at the trade deadline, as LHP reliever Frank Garces (35 IP, 5.14 ERA) doesn’t really count towards winning. Evidently, it took A.J. Preller months to realize the value of having at least one reliable left-hander in the bullpen. It’s really tough (for whomever is managing) to get outs against tough lefty hitters in crucial late-game situations, with only right-handers in the pen. This is baseball 101, not complex sabermetrics.
Bud Black– fired after a 32-33 start
Speaking of managers, the Padres haven’t had one since they fired Bud Black in mid-June. Did you hear about it? Since then it’s been interim manager Pat Murphy, who can best be described as a warm body. Black had been the second-longest tenured manager in MLB at the time of his firing, and was well-respected by the players and other mangers.
Darren Balsley– one of the best
Ace pitching coach Darren Balsley worked well with Bud Black, particularly in the development of their young starters RHP’s Tyson Ross & Andrew Cashner. Since Bud Black was fired as manager, Balsley (who is a master a spotting breakdowns in pitching mechanics while offering helpful advice) rarely makes a trip to the mound anymore.
Ross & Cashner were the most-asked-about Padres players up to the trade deadline, instead of the players they were trying to deal; including closer Craig Kimbrel, SP James Shields, and LF Justin Upton. To GM A.J. Preller’s credit, he didn’t panic and give away valuable assets at the July 31st deadline, despite shrieking hysterics from the media. It was a buyer’s market, as top talent including: SS Troy Tulowitzki, and ace LHP’s David Price and Cole Hamels outshined Shields & Upton, or anything else the Padres had available.
The off-season deals that brought in Wil Myers, Matt Kemp, Justin Upton, James Shields, Craig Kimbrel & Melvin Upton, Jr reshaped this team completely, while affecting their payroll flexibility going forward.
The most hurtful deal to the Padres organization was trading C Yasmani Grandal to the Dodgers for RF Matt Kemp. Grandal is a good defensive catcher, age 26, with a career line of .247/.356/.418; who makes $693,000 in 2015, and won’t be eligible for free agency until 2019 at the earliest.
Matt Kemp is now turning 30, and really is much older in terms of playing age. It hurts him to run; watch closely and you’ll see a once-great athlete with degenerative arthritis in his knees, hips & back. The skills still flash at times, but the body has broken down, so he can’t perform with consistency. Preller not only traded a valuable commodity in Grandal to get Kemp, but also took on too much salary. LA pays $18 million of the $21+ million he’s owed this year, after that the Padres are on the hook for $18+ million/year through 2019.
Wil Myers came over from the TB Rays in a frenzied 4-team deal. Myers was/is a RF. Joe Maddon is considered one of the best, and most creative managers in the game, and he never considered Myers in CF. The Padres started the season with the-player-formerly-known-as B.J. Upton on the DL, with turf toe in the right foot. Wil Venable was the only SD Padre capable of playing centerfield. Instead, Myers was moved to center, flanked by Justin Upton & Matt Kemp.
Predictably Myers was a disaster in center– missteps & bad jumps, taking awkward routes, diving for balls other centerfielder’s catch easily; costing his pitchers outs, runs and wins. None of this was Wil Myers’ fault, as his coaching staff & GM put him in a position to fail– and he did. His wrist problems which began in TB, were aggravated by playing an unfamiliar (and more demanding) defensive position, and Myers ended up needing wrist surgery– costing him half the 2015 season. He’s still one of their most valuable long-term assets.
Justin Upton was brought over from the Braves in a series of multi-team trades that (in hindsight) really didn’t cost the Padres much in terms of prospects. He’s paid $14.5 million in 2015, which is considered a bargain. He’s a free agent at season’s end. The Padres would love to keep him, but the problem is they have Matt Kemp too, and only enough room in the outfield for one of them.
Wil Myers (if he’s going to stay healthy & productive) has to be a corner outfielder. Unless the Padres can move Kemp, which will mean eating a huge chunk of his contract, then they can’t even entertain the thought of resigning Justin Upton. San Diego will likely make Upton a qualifying offer, and then take the draft choice when he signs a free-agent deal elsewhere.
Melvin (I’m calling him B.J.) Upton isn’t the greatest option in CF (thru 72 G: .244/.310/.417), but the Padres have him for 3 seasons at $15 million/year, so they have to play him. Like James Shields (mostly) and Carl Crawford (surely), his best years were in Tampa; and the B.J. stood for Bossman Jr., which was the best name in baseball for years.
Bossman Jr
James Shields is in his 10th MLB season, with over 2000 IP in his career. He will be 34 in December, and is probably best recognized now as a very good #3 starter on a championship-level team. In his prime, Shields was a horse #2 starter. Once again, the problem for the Padres isn’t that the player stinks, it’s that they overpay him. The $10 million this season seems fair enough, but the $21 million/year from 2016-18 limits the trade options.
Yangervis Solarte 3B
Yangervis Solarte at 3B has been a nice surprise hitting .272/.335/.430 as of this writing, while playing good defense at the hot corner. A.J. Preller’s original ‘plan’ was Will Middlebrooks at third, whose 4 MLB seasons have so far produced .231/.274/.399. Middlebrooks is a classic example of someone who is overvalued because he played on a great team (Boston Red Sox). As a comparison, he’s less valuable than NY Yankee utility IF Luis Sojo: .261/.297/.352 in 13 seasons.
Shortstop is still a mess for the Friars, as it’s been an endless carousel since the inconsistency of the Khalil Greene era, from 2003-08. Suffice it to say it’s really an important position, and you can’t be a good team without one.
The latest experiment is to try 2B Jedd Gyorko at SS. Gyorko has the hands & skills, but neither the athleticism nor the arm for shortstop. This move reeks of desperation, and highlights the inability of Padres leadership to learn from their past mistakes. More than anything, Gyorko needs to hit better as his .239/.292/.397 line is approaching replacement level. He is making $2 million this season, but is owed at least $33 million though 2019.
The Padres snagged 1B Yonder Alonso (along with Yasmani Grandal!) from the Reds in the Mat Latos deal. He’s still light on power for first base, and he can’t stay healthy (which is also a skill). His career .282/.361/.381 batting line helps, if only a little. Not all of his injuries have been his fault. This video of Justin Upton unintentionally hitting Alonso with his batting helmet, succinctly encapsulates the frustration & futility of Padres’ 2015 season.
Other SD Padres notes:
1B Adrian Gonzalez would have been a great organizational investment.
West coast bias in sports is real. One reason I chose to be a Padres fan was to test that theory.
RHP’s Brandon Morrow & Josh Johnson both spent the season on the DL, which should have surprised no one.
On 7/19/15, the Padres had their first rainout since 4/04/06. It almost never rains in San Diego. The game against the Rockies was suspended in the 5th inning, and was made up on September 10th– which COL won 4-3.
Dick Enberg does the Padres play-by-play on television, and he’s still a first-rate announcer. He was selected as the 2015 recipient of the Ford C. Frick Award, presented annually for excellence in broadcasting by the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum. I personally remember enjoying Enberg when he called the NFL, NCAA basketball, professional tennis, and Olympics for NBC in the 1970’s & 1980’s. He’s always been a thoughtful & pleasant conversationalist on the air, and still has a great voice.
Ted Leitner is in his 36th season behind the microphone for ‘My Padres.’ Baseball is a great game to listen to on the radio.
The Padres military programs which started in 1996, are the most successful in baseball– in terms of market penetration. San Diego is home to several of the largest military installations in the world; including the Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, Naval Base Coronado, Naval Base San Diego, and US Coast Guard Station San Diego. Taped games are sent to the entire U.S. Pacific fleet for on-board viewing, via the Padres at Sea program. Every Sunday home game is Military Appreciation Day (along with Memorial Day, Independence Day, and Labor Day), as the Pads wear their camouflage jerseys, which has now been copied by other teams across MLB. I have mixed feelings about all of this.
The Padres organization has tried to reach into Mexico, as San Diego is the city closest to the border, with mixed results. Note to management: the best way to get Latin America to follow your baseball team, is by having good Latin American players in the organization & lineup.
Matt Kemp hit for the cycle on 8/14/15 , becoming the first Padre in franchise history to do so, in the club’s 7,444th game. Now only the Marlins haven’t accomplished this feat.
The Padres still haven’t thrown a no-hitter, nor won a World Series. They began play in 1969.
The Padres enshrined C Benito Santiago and SS Garry Templeton into their Hall of Fame. In 1981, the Padres traded a young Ozzie Smith to STL, for Templeton.
In conclusion, this organization is a mess, and A.J. Preller has a 5-year contract; so it’s going to be up to him to learn on-the-job and fix it, or suffer the consequences. This fan remains unconvinced after the spectacular crash of 2015. Preller often seems enamoured with his ‘rock star‘ image, to the point where it affects his better judgement.
He succeeds GM Josh Byrnes, who left due to serious disagreements with CEO Mike Dee, over where this organization is in terms of winning a championship. As a Padres fan who signed up on a one-season deal, I’d only take another one-year fan contract from this organization. One of the best parts of being a Padres fan is knowing that many of us really don’t care about winning. Baseball is paid-for entertainment, nothing more. I personally love streaming their games, listening to the drunken fans at Petco chanting “Let’s go, Padres!”– then hearing it quickly lose its rhythm & enthusiasm, completely collapsing upon itself several responses– signalling to all, that Padres fans actually know their team.
Darryl Hamilton hit at the top of the order, and played all across the outfield for the Milwaukee Brewers from 1988-1995. He was a huge fan favorite, an affable and humble man. His career batting line of .291/.360/.385 made him valuable for his OBP, but a liability for his lack of power. He wasn’t a true centerfielder, although he was often pressed into playing CF because the Brewers needed him to. It’s also worth mentioning that in the PED-era, no one ever wondered if Darryl Hamilton was juicing, because he obviously wasn’t.
As a fan, I liked Darryl Hamilton because he always seemed happy: playing, practicing, warming up, batting practice, during the game, during interviews, etc…. He never ducked the media (he actually welcomed it), as a part of a young Brewers core that could have won a World Series– if they had been managed decently.
Hamilton came up as a prospect in the Brewers organization with 3B Gary Sheffield, and while they looked alike to many of the racist die-hards who still only cheered for CF Robin Yount and DH Paul Molitor, they were completely different in style and character.
Sheffield was brash and outspoken, with unbelievable bat speed and power. By the end of 1991, Brewers management under owner Bud Selig and GM’s Harry Dalton & Sal Bando, had so frustrated the young Sheffield over the course of his first four seasons, that they felt compelled to trade him away.
In return for a 23-year old Hall of Fame slugger (career– 22 seasons, .292/.393/.514); the Brewers received RHP gopher-baller Ricky Bones, quadruple-A outfielder Matt Mieske, and utility infielder Jose Valentin (career 16 seasons, .243/.301/.373) from the San Diego Padres.
Darryl Hamilton stayed behind and was quiet, steady and effective; at the plate and in the outfield. The Brewers of that era had a crowded outfield situation, complicated by the insistence of management that Robin Yount (in decline) be given priority, over younger talent including Hamilton, LF Greg Vaughn, OF/DH Dante Bichette, and C/3B B.J.Surhoff– who needed to be moved to the outfield.
Yount was approaching the 3000-hit milestone, always a bonanza for ownership, and was given disproportionate playing time (which hurt the team’s chances to win) in order to reach that goal. Yount’s line in 1992: 629 PA; .264/325/390. Only SS Pat Listash (.290/352/.349), and DH Paul Molitor (.320/.389/.461- still their best player) had more PAs.
Of course the biggest reason these Brewers failed was their starting pitching. Their ace had been LHP Teddy Higuera, who as a rookie in 1985, through 1988 was as good as any pitcher in baseball. By 1989, his rotator cuff/ labrum became completely torn from the heavy workload, and he was never the same afterwards. Higuera’s last MLB season was in 1994 (1-5, ERA 7.06); after that Señor Smoke pitched in the Mexican leagues for several years.
The Brewers never had a dominant strikeout pitcher after losing Higuera, as their rotation consisted of an endless line of mediocrities including: Jaime Navarro, Bill Wegman, Chris Bosio, Juan Nieves, and Cal Eldred. The Brewers had nothing resembling an ace, or even a solid #2 starter, until Ben Sheets debuted in 2001.
All this conspired to diminish Darryl Hamilton’s true value in Milwaukee, as the Brewers could never score enough runs to keep up with their poor starting pitching. Most of Hamilton’s best years were with the Brewers, and yet he only made the post-season after becoming a free agent.
Darryl Hamilton never seemed to have trouble getting a major league contract from winning teams during his free-agent years, making the post-season with the Rangers, Giants, and Mets (twice), before retiring after the 2001 season. He played 13 MLB seasons in total.
Many Brewers (and baseball) fans, and are now saddened by the news of his tragic & untimely death.
Hamilton was found shot dead at a suburban Houston home, suffering multiple gunshot wounds. Monica Jordan, the mother of their 14-month child, was found dead in another room– apparently a suicide. Their child was left alive.
The woman reporting for ESPN in this video (Antonietta Collins) is unable to state those facts. She states this instead:
“MLB is mourning the death of Darryl Hamilton, who was fatally shot. His girlfriend was also found dead, and according to police of an apparent self-inflicted gun wound.”
Feminism & post-modernism share the common bond being completely irrational and unhelpful forms of ‘thinking.’ Post-modernism is the male intellectual version of nonsense as ideology; feminism is that form of poison for women.
Both ignore hard and ugly truths. Darryl Hamilton’s tragic death is a high-profile celebrity murder, for which feminism has no answers, precisely because their stock answer is to hysterically blame men for all violence.
The answers to these bizarre & horrible crimes, which are now the new normal, is for mankind to use science in all fields; in order to shout down and overwhelm these destructive ideologies & stereotypes, which have been forced upon all of us since birth.
Obviously society now has a problem with women’s violence towards men. Why don’t feminists discuss this using a scientific approach? To not do so, betrays a lack of honesty in intention.
Feminists will throw up smokescreens and run for cover on this until it blows over, as they are organically incapable of any progressive solutions, being tied to the dead-ends of liberalism and the Democratic party. Most of these ‘thinkers’ can’t even allow themselves to acknowledge that a problem exists.
If this tragedy had been reversed, with Darryl Hamilton killing Monica Jordan– then taking himself; the child would likely be dead too, and the tone from the feminist talk-show hostesses would be sensationalized outrage. He would be vilified & disgraced, as a heartless coward.
Preamble: A man goes to a pro-league game to watch a professional sporting event. By half-time, he’s vexed with a headache from exploding scoreboards, cheerleaders, endless promotions and loud music– all during the game. He seeks the team’s general manager to express his preference for a game, without circuses. The GM (yet another Bill Veeck disciple) replies, “You’re what we call a purist, there aren’t very many of you.”
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Pat Williams came to Orlando in 1986, at the behest of local businessman Jimmy Hewitt.
His job was to bring a NBA franchise to Orlando, and he did so by convincing 14,176 metro sports fans to reserve season tickets for a team that didn’t yet exist.
This gave Orlando the highest total of any city vying for a NBA franchise at the time, and on April 22, 1987 they were granted one to begin play in 1989-90. [1]
Pat Williams was the GM in Philadelphia from 1974-86, helping build a team that won the 1982-83 NBA championship.
Williams engineered trades for Hall-of-Famers: Julius Erving and Moses Malone, while drafting All-Star performers Maurice Cheeks and Andrew Toney.
He finally became frustrated with the 76ers mismanagement, and despite having a young Charles Barkley, he left for Orlando in June 1986.
John Gabriel, who began in public relations in 1983 with the 76ers, was Williams’ first hire.
Together these two created the image for the Orlando Magic; from their mascot name (which Disney approved), logos & colors, down to basketball personnel & staff. [2]
It was first Pat Williams (before being put out to pasture around 1996), then John Gabriel who called the shots for the Orlando Magic, until Gabriel was fired in 2004.
Rich DeVos & family finalized the purchase of the Orlando Magic on Sept. 19, 1991 for $85 million, and have been the owners ever since.
DeVos made his fortune in Amway, a multi-level marketing (MLM) pyramid scheme founded in 1959, whose financial success has made his family one of the wealthiest in the world.
A shadowy figure throughout Orlando Magic franchise history is Alex Martins.
He began his career with the Magic in 1989, as PR director.
Martins has multiple business degrees, and has never played nor coached college/professional basketball.
In 2006 he was promoted to COO of the Magic, a position he has held up to this writing.
Martins forever won the favor of DeVos, by finally arm-twisting the city of Orlando into a new publicly-funded $500 million sports arena, which opened in 2010, as the Amway Center.
The original Orlando arena, colloquially known as the “O-Rena,” opened in 1989 and served as home for the Magic until the 2010-11 season.
In 1999, TD Waterhouse purchased the naming rights, and renamed the venue the TD Waterhouse Centre.
In 2006, DeVos bought the naming rights, and changed it to the Amway Arena.
The Magic made Orlando a NBA city, following an expansion fee of $32.5 million.
Williams hired Matt Guokas (76ers) as head coach and assistant GM, who helped him & Gabriel select twelve players in the NBA Expansion Draft on June 15, 1989.
In the 1989 NBA Draft; Guokas, Williams & Gabriel chose Nick Anderson (Illinois, 11th overall), the first pick for the Magic franchise.
The inaugural team included Reggie Theus, Scott Skiles, Terry Catledge, Sam Vincent and Otis Smith; finishing 18–64.
Most importantly, they sold out all their home games.
In their second (1990) NBA draft, the Orlando Magic nabbed Dennis Scott (Ga. Tech) with the 4th overall pick.
The 1991 draft was a disaster, as they blew both 1st round picks on stiff/overweight centers (#10 Bison Dele [Arizona] and #23 Stanley Roberts [LSU]).
The Magic’s fortunes forever changed on May 17, 1992, when the franchise won the first pick in the 1992 NBA Draft Lottery.
Shaquille O’Neal (LSU) was the consensus #1 pick; a 7-1, 300-pound (in his salad days) ultra-athletic freak, who had just turned age 20.
Even with Shaquille O’Neal’s presence, the Magic just missed the 1993 NBA Playoffs.
For this they received the slimmest chance of gaining the top draft pick, with only one ping-pong ball in the lottery hopper.
Miraculously, the Magic again won the first pick and selected the correct player–Chris Webber (Michigan), whom they immediately traded to Golden State for the #3 overall pick– Anfernee Hardaway (Memphis St.), and three future #1 picks [in 1996, 1998 and 2000].
Anfernee “Penny” Hardaway was an All-Star shooting guard for the Magic, until he sustained a left knee injury early in the 1997-98 NBA season.
Orlando Magic team doctors carelessly allowed Hardaway to return to the court early, largely in an effort to play in the upcoming All-Star game.
In the process, he re-injured his knee, and ended up requiring more surgery.
He missed the remainder of that season, was never the same player again.
In 1993-94 with Shaq & Penny, along with new head coach Brian Hill, the Magic finished 50-32: but were swept by the Indiana Pacers 3-0 in the 1st round.
In the off-season, Orlando made a free agent splash, by signing power forward Horace Grant from the Chicago Bulls.
Grant’s production numbers in five seasons with the Orlando Magic (12 pts/ 8 rebs), had value.
Unfortunately Horace Grant’s contract was an overpay, which handcuffed the organization down the road.
Note: None of this was Horace Grant’s fault, as any NBA player offered an outrageously generous contract, happily signs it.
In 1994-95 Orlando went 57-25, making it all the way to the NBA Finals.
It was a season to be envied; as Shaq, Penny, Nick Anderson, Dennis Scott & Horace Grant were the darlings of the league.
Coached by Brian Hill, they ruined Michael Jordan’s early comeback attempt, and by June were picked by many experts to win it.
“Why not now?” became the organizational mantra. [3]
That question was definitively answered when they collapsed to the resilient & savvy Houston Rockets (47-35 during the season); allowing themselves to be swept 4-0.
Nick Anderson’s four free-throw misses, late in Game 1 are always pointed to as a focal point for the Magic meltdown.
A look at the stats from the series reveals that the Houston Rockets were simply better; with Hakeem Olajuwon, Clyde Drexler and Robert Horry completely outplaying O’Neal, Hardaway, and Grant. [4]
Things looked bright early in 1995-96, as the Magic went a franchise best 60-22 in the regular season; but soured quickly in the Eastern Conference Finals when they were once again swept away, this time by the Chicago Bulls 4-0.
After this humiliation/realization, Shaquille O’Neal announced he was leaving Orlando to sign as a free agent with the LA Lakers.
This was announced as the Summer Olympics were being held in Atlanta, with Shaq as a member of the second Dream Team; one of his teammates was Penny.
With Shaq gone, the Magic were considered Hardaway’s team.
Penny took charge by leading a player’s revolt that ousted head coach Brian Hill.
In an organizational low-point (and that’s saying a lot for the Magic), Brian Hill was interviewed live on NBC, immediately after a dismal loss in Chicago on Sunday, February 16, 1997.
The reporter ambushed Hill point blank, asking if he had any comment about the rumor he’s about to be fired.
Hill was stunned, replying he had no knowledge or comment, before exiting up the tunnel. Peter Vecsey broke the story, and stood by it as a studio guest, after the Hill interview.
The Magic organization had no comment on any of this, until Brian Hill was fired the next evening, after the Magic lost in Charlotte.
Next season, Hardaway suffered the left knee injury, that ended up arthritic.
He was traded to the Phoenix Suns in the summer of 1999 for: Danny Manning, Pat Garrity, and two future first round-draft picks (2001 & 2002).
Both Penny Hardaway deals are instructive examples of wanton wastefulness, and deserve examination:
The 2001 pick (#18 overall) was included as part of a deal to clear cap room, and became Jason Collins (Stanford) picked by the Houston Rockets.
The Magic gave the 2002 pick back to Phoenix on November 16, 2001, as part of a 3-team trade, the Magic received Jud Buechler.
Phoenix used this pick to select Amar’e Stoudemire (Cypress Creek HS, Orlando [!]), with the #9 overall pick in the 2002 NBA draft.
The Orlando Magic also received three #1 picks with Penny Hardaway, in exchange for Chris Webber in 1993; here’s how they turned out:
The 1996 #1 pick ended up being traded back to Golden State, who selected Todd Fuller (NC St.) with the #11 pick overall.
In exchange for it, the Magic got a 1st round pick in 1998, which became Keon Clark– (UNLV, 13th overall), picked by the Magic.
Keon Clark was immediately traded to the Denver Nuggets for a 2000 1st round pick, which became Keyon Dooling (Missouri)– selected #10 overall by the Magic.
Dooling was immediately traded (along with Corey Maggette, Derek Strong and cash), to the Los Angeles Clippers– for a 2006 1st round draft pick.
This pick was then traded in 2002, to the Denver Nuggets– for a 2004 2nd round draft pick.
February 19, 2003: the Orlando Magic trade this pick (along with Ryan Humphrey, Mike Miller and a 2003 1st round draft pick (#27 pick overall–Kendrick Perkins was selected); to the Memphis Grizzlies for Gordan Giricek and Drew Gooden.
The 1998 #1 pick ended up being traded back to Golden State, who selected Vince Carter (North Carolina) with the #5 overall pick.
The 2000 #1 pick ended up being used by Orlando to take Mike Miller (Florida– 5th overall), who became the 2000-01 NBA Rookie of the Year for the Magic.
Doc Rivers took over the Magic, after Chuck Daley retired as head coach in 1999.
Darrell Armstrong had emerged as their best young player, and Doc Rivers was the perfect guy to coach him up.
Armstrong won the NBA 6th Man of the Year Award and the NBA Most Improved Player Award in 1999, becoming the first player to win both awards simultaneously.
The 1999-2000 Orlando Magic are known forever as the Heart & Hustle team.
They went 41-41, just missing the playoffs.
Their roster was full of young players and cast-offs who never quit, including: Ben Wallace, Bo Outlaw, John Amaechi, Chucky Atkins, Corey Maggette, and Matt Harpring.
Doc Rivers was named Coach of the Year, the first (and only) time the award went to a coach, whose team failed to qualify for the playoffs.
John Gabriel had been the GM in charge of the Magic, ever since Pat Williams was retired and kicked upstairs in the mid-1990’s.
The Penny Hardaway trade illustrations, discussed above were part of his master plan to clear salary cap room, in order to sign two top-tier free agents in the 2000 off-season.
The top prize was Tim Duncan, as the Orlando Magic went all out to bring him to central Florida.
They had already signed shooting guard Tracy McGrady, from the Toronto Raptors; and were convinced they needed Duncan as their big man.
Duncan ended up staying with the Spurs, and Plan B for Gabriel was Tracy McGrady & small forward, Grant Hill.
Background: on April 15, 2000, Grant Hill (playing for Detroit) sprained his left ankle in a game against the Philadelphia 76ers.
He continued to play until the first round playoff series against Miami.
The injury worsened, and Hill was forced to leave halfway through Game 2.
The Heat swept the Pistons 3–0.
Grant Hill was initially selected for the 2000 Olympics team, but could not play due to the ankle injury.
Hill was still in a cast & crutches when the Orlando Magic inked him to a 7-year, $94 million guaranteed contract; obtained in a sign & trade with Detroit.
The Orlando Magic traded Ben Wallace & Chucky Atkins to Detroit, for the rights to a crippled Grant Hill– at maximum money.
Ben Wallace’s monster defense & rebounding were invaluable in helping the Detroit Pistons win the NBA championship in 2003-04.
Grant Hill never played a full season for the Magic, as team doctors and officials kept rushing him back onto the court, only to have him re-injure himself.
In March 2003, Hill underwent a major surgical procedure in which doctors re-fractured his ankle and realigned it with his leg bone.
Five days after the surgery, Hill developed a 104.5 °F fever with convulsions, requiring him to be rushed to the hospital.
Doctors removed the splint around his ankle and discovered a nasty MRSA infection.
He was hospitalized in serious condition for a week, and on intravenous antibiotics for six months.
This is a fair illustration of the medical care Grant Hill received as a member of the Orlando Magic. [5]
When Hill’s contract expired, he signed with Phoenix: playing in 70, 82, 81 and 80 games, in his first four seasons.
By the 2003-04 season, Gabriel’s plan had completely busted, as the Magic went 21-61; worst in the league.
John Gabriel was fired, along with Doc Rivers.
Gabriel eventually returned to the NBA as an executive and scout with the NY Knicks; he has now been diagnosed with Parkinson’s. Doc Rivers won a NBA title as head coach of the 2007-08 Boston Celtics, and currently is head coach of the LA Clippers.
John Weisbrod was named the new GM.
“Who the hell is John Weisbrod?” was the question everyone asked around the NBA.
It was a difficult question to answer seriously, as Weisbrod had an extended track record of successful scouting– in hockey.
As far as anyone could tell, he had never managed any basketball team before, at any level.
More background: the Orlando Solar Bears were owned by the DeVos family, and began IHL play in 1995.
They were successful until the league folded in 2001, winning the IHL’s final Turner Cup, its championship trophy.
When the IHL disbanded, DeVos promoted Weisbrod into the Magic organization, in an administrative position.
Weisbrod was promoted to GM of the Magic, after Gabriel was fired during the disastrous 2003–2004 season.
Again the Magic were beneficiaries of amazingly good fortune as they landed the #1 pick in the draft again!!– just as consensus blue-chipper Dwight Howard declared his eligibility (Southwest Atlanta Christian Academy, #1 overall).
Anderson Varejao (Brazil) was also drafted by the Orlando Magic, in the 2nd round (30th pick) of the 2004 draft.
This is notable, because it is the only player of substance the Magic have ever drafted beyond the 1st round.
Varejao was, of course, immediately shipped to the Cleveland Cavaliers (with Drew Gooden and Steven Hunter); for Tony Battie and more future draft picks to fritter away.
GM John Weisbrod fired Doc Rivers early into the 2003-04 season, and promoted Johnny Davis to interim head coach; the temporary label was removed as he was declared head coach for 2004-05.
Until with only 18 games left in the miserable 2004–2005 campaign, Weisbrod fired Davis, and named assistant-coach Chris Jent interim head coach.
Weisbrod also clumsily mishandled superstar Tracy McGrady, who was developing serious back problems, from carrying too much of the load for the Magic. He had quietly asked to be traded, then was jerked around by management, until a whirlwind 7-player deal sent McGrady, Juwan Howard, and Tyronn Lue to the Houston Rockets; for which the Magic received volatile point guard Stevie (lighten up) Francis, along with fungibles Cuttino Mobley and Kelvin Cato.
On May 23, 2005, Weisbrod resigned from his position of General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of the Orlando Magic, under intense fan & media scrutiny.
He has since worked exclusively in the NHL; with the Dallas Stars, Boston Bruins, Calgary Flames and Vancouver Canucks.
Otis Smith played for the Magic from 1989-92, then became their Director of Community Relations from 1996–1998, before heading to Golden State for a better management position.
Smith returned to the Magic, spending two years as Director of Player Development, before being promoted to co-General Manager for 2005-2006 season.
Otis Smith was then named GM of the Orlando Magic on May 3, 2006, finally officially replacing Weisbrod.
Meanwhile, someone in the Magic organization had rehired Brian Hill, who coached them to a 36–46 record in 2005–2006.
In May 2007, multiple media sources reported that Hill would not return to coach the Orlando Magic in 2007-08.
Later, it was reported he had been fired by GM Otis Smith.
Otis Smith’s first selection in the 2005 NBA draft was Fran Vazquez (Spain–C, 6-10, 240 lbs)– #11 pick overall.
Vazquez quickly & definitively decided to stay in Spain, never playing in the NBA– the Magic still retain his rights.
It is still unclear as to whether anyone in the Orlando Magic front office ever bothered to speak with Vazquez before selecting him.
These are his stats in Europe through age 32, look them over and tell me what that selection was about? [6]
Here is a link to the entire Orlando Magic draft history. [7]
Outside of the early GM Pat Williams/Matt Guokas picks, and obvious #1 overall selections, it appears this organization rarely does any homework.
Year after year its usually wasted picks, as this organization lacks basketball brains at the top.
Examine their media guide for proof, as nearly every executive has a degree in business/marketing, with little-to-no basketball background. [8]
Franchises such as the Miami Heat, LA Lakers & Indiana Pacers retain hoops brains like Pat Riley, Jerry West & Larry Bird.
When Pat Williams gets too old, the Orlando Magic bring in figurines like Julius Erving & Patrick Ewing, who may have been great players, but lack an eye for talent and skills in player development.
Their roles are strictly PR, with nebulous VP titles and no real organizational influence.
Ever since Doc Rivers was pink-slipped, the Magic have developed very few championship-level NBA players.
They are, in many ways, the NBA’s managerial opposite of the San Antonio Spurs.
After Brian Hill was released/fired for the second time, the Magic signed UF head basketball coach Billy Donovan.
Shortly after the announcement, Donovan changed his mind about the five-year, $27.5 million deal, and expressed his desire to return to the University of Florida. [9]
After a week of haggling, on June 5, 2007 the Magic finally released Donovan; and offered another contract to Stan Van Gundy, whom had been their original choice.
The Miami Heat allowed Van Gundy to leave to coach the Magic, in exchange for draft picks and cash.
Side-note: Billy Donovan was made to sign a five-year NBA no-compete contract with the Magic, keeping him at UF. Donovan recently signed a deal to coach the Oklahoma City Thunder.
The most success the Magic ever found, was the 2008–09 season, when the Magic won 59 games under Stan Van Gundy.
Howard was an All-NBA player by then, and a beast in the 2009 playoffs; besting the Eastern Conference favorite Cleveland Cavaliers, led by LeBron James.
The Magic advanced to the NBA Finals, but lost several tight games, failing to execute late; and they were defeated by the Los Angeles Lakers 4-1.
Orlando hasn’t seriously competed for a title since.
On May 21, 2012, Van Gundy was fired (along with GM Otis Smith), despite coaching his team to the playoffs in all five seasons.
Prior to the firing, Van Gundy had stated he had knowledge that Dwight Howard wanted him fired; that somebody from management had told him so; and that the team did not want to risk alienating Dwight Howard, who was their star player– able to opt out of his contract the following season. [10]
This whole saga is still referred to in Orlando as Dwightmare. [11]
Bob Vander Weide joined the Magic in 1992 as vice president of basketball operations.
He served as president for 16 years before being named CEO in July 2010, on the strength of his marriage to Cheri DeVos.
He was dismissed from the organization in the wake of; 1) her filing for divorce in 2012, and; 2) his drunk-calling Dwight Howard in the middle of the night, trying to persuade him to stay in Orlando.
Bob Vander Weide’s thoughts on the prospect of losing Dwight Howard (and how it compared to losing Shaq) were, “It’s a taxing process, but you learn from each one.” [12]
The reasons for Dwight Howard’s departure after 8 seasons in Orlando boil down to organizational incompetence & poor drafting, as J.J Redick (Duke #11 overall in 2006) was the only pick after 2004, that ever helped the Magic win.
Their inability to build a championship team around Howard, is perfectly illustrated in the Rashard Lewis signing, and then his trade.
July 11, 2007: Rashard Lewis was signed & traded by the Seattle SuperSonics to the Orlando Magic, here’s the contract:
2007-08 Orlando Magic $14,880,000
2008-09 Orlando Magic $16,447,871
2009-10 Orlando Magic $18,876,000
2010-11 Washington Wizards $19,573,711
2011-12 Washington Wizards $21,136,631
2012-13 New Orleans Hornets $13,700,000
Rashard Lewis was a 3/4 tweener, who could shoot; but didn’t rebound or help much defensively.
That’s neither a guy you give max money to, nor a championship player.
Those details never bother Orlando Magic management.
Lewis became untradable, until he was traded for another, even more untradable player– Gilbert Arenas in 2010:
On December 18, 2010 Rashard Lewis was traded by the Orlando Magic to the Washington Wizards for Gilbert Arenas, who could no longer play– due to knee injuries.
This was the money Arenas was owed at the time of the trade:
2010-11 Orlando Magic NBA $17,730,694
2011-12 Orlando Magic NBA $19,269,307
2012-13 Orlando Magic NBA $20,807,922
Arenas signed a six-year, $111 million contract in 2008 with the Wizards.
He was later suspended 50 games by the NBA, for bringing guns into the locker room.
On December 9, 2011, Arenas was waived by the Orlando Magic under the amnesty clause.
His salary was no longer counted against the cap, but the Magic still had to pay Arenas over $58 million.
Incredibly, they’re still paying him through 2016, even though he hasn’t played in the NBA since 2012. [13]
GM Otis Smith in 2006, “We’re building around a group of young guys in Dwight Howard, Jameer Nelson, Darko Milicic and Travis Diener.” [14]
No wonder Dwight Howard finally bolted.
On August 10, 2012, Dwight Howard was dealt to the LA Lakers, as the centerpiece of a 4-team trade.
Prior to Downtown Master Plan 3, DeVos and son-in-law Bob Vander Weide, had been pressing the city of Orlando for a new arena for over a decade.
The Amway arena was built in 1989, prior to digital technology & advanced entertainment arenas.
It quickly became derided as antiquated, with too few luxury boxes, too far from the court.
That hurt revenue streams, and made it a difficult for rich people to be seen prominently at Orlando Magic games. [15]
On September 29, 2006, after years of backroom negotiations, Orlando Mayor Buddy Dyer, Orange County Mayor Richard Crotty, and the Orlando Magic announced an agreement on a new arena in downtown Orlando.
The Amway Center broke ground on July 25, 2008.
It opened on October 1, 2010.
The construction cost was $480 million.
On April 3, 2010 it was reported that Fitch Rating Agency had downgraded the bonds used to finance the new arena to “junk” status.
Rob Hennigan was made GM of the Orlando Magic in 2012, replacing Otis Smith.
Hired at age 30, and still the youngest GM in the NBA [16], Hennigan just signed an extension through the 2017-18 season.
Television Broadcasting: Jack “Goose” Givens was the Orlando Magic television color commentator for Sun Sports and the FS Florida cable stations, from 1989-2004. Givens was relieved of his position in 2004, over allegations of him molesting a 14-year old girl. [18] He was acquitted of the charges, but was never offered another job with any organization. He was replaced with Matt Guokas, then Jeff Turner.
Chip Carey & “Goose” Givens were originally paired from inception through 1997-98. In 1998, Carey took his shtick to TBS (and FOX), to do play-by-play for the Atlanta Braves, with his father Skip.
David Steele took over the mic in 1998-99 (he did the Magic radio broadcast 1989-98), and is still one of the best NBA play-by-play announcers. Steele has great respect for, and knowledge of the game; and is silky smooth in his call of the action. He is one of the best assets this organization has, and Magic fans have been fortunate to have him on the air all these years.
Overall, the Orlando Magic are easily one of the worst (if not the worst) organizations is American sports, No one has done less with more than the Magic in their short existence. They are eerily similar to the Minnesota Vikings in the NFL, who will never win a Super Bowl, due to deep organization flaws and lack of understanding of what it takes to win. The Magic keeping hoping for more luck, instead of reflecting on & learning from, the boundless opportunities they’ve squandered over their 26-year existence. [19]
The Orlando Magic are owned by a Ponzi scheme billionaire, who understands nothing about building real value. His modus operandi is: if there are no immediate results or quick returns, then blame whomever is convenient; discard them and start anew. Right now, the Orlando Magic are as far from winning a championship as a franchise can get.
This is why star players leave Orlando, repeatedly. It’s also why free agents are no longer dazzled. The fan base is constantly being dumbed-down by the insipid journalism of the Orlando Sentinel. Michael A. Bianchi & the rest have been covering the Magic for decades, never producing any insight on the striking maladies of this franchise. There is never any reflection on past history or mistakes, and therefore never any understanding leading to diagnosis of the problem. Instead of fact-checking, hard questions, and intelligent analysis; fans & readers get pandered to, with half-baked recommendations and useless speculation. [20]
It speaks volumes that with all this history, no Orlando Magic player has had their number retired. The only retired number is 6– for the fans as the “6th Man.” Very little of the players’ sacrifices seem to be appreciated by those running the Magic. Nick Anderson, Shaquille O’Neal, Darrell Armstrong, Tracy McGrady, and Dwight Howard all deserve to be recognized & honored. That’s the short list. It won’t happen with the Orlando Magic under DeVos, as they are the very definition of a bush-league franchise, proving you just can’t buy respect.
Do you have a favorite team, which you have rooted for forever, but never wins?
Does it irritate, depress, or frustrate you that they lose, with no chance of winning?
Say No to all of this, with Fan Free Agency; in which fans (like the players & owners) can renegotiate their loyalties, whenever its convenient. Let me illustrate…
Growing up, I was a Cincinnati Reds fan. It was the mid-1970’s, and they were baseball’s best team. Joe Morgan (2B) was my favorite player, because he played smart and could do it all. When the Big Red Machine was traded away/ broke down, I hung with them through the losing of the 1980’s. After being denied the playoffs in 1981, despite having the best record in baseball, the Reds once proud farm system now produced more suspects than prospects– in the forms of Ron Oester, Gary Redus, and Nick Esasky. Player/ manager Pete Rose’s betting scandal rocked the organization by decade’s end, and Marge Schott’s racism & ignorant ownership meddling always lurked in the background. Patience was finally rewarded in 1990, when the Reds went wire-to-wire and won the World Series, sweeping the mighty Oakland A’s.
Diehards stayed with them when they were quickly surpassed by the Atlanta Braves in the 1990’s. Center-fielder Eric Davis & SS Barry Larkin were my favorite players. I really didn’t care for other Reds ‘star’ players including Reggie Sanders, Ron Gant, and Hal Morris; whom I noticed were almost always neutralized by good pitching. But hey–you still stick with your team, right? So I did, even when I knew they couldn’t compete with the best.
When the Reds went all-in on Ken Griffey Jr. in 2000, fans were excited. A few years later, the reality of Griffey’s superstar contract on the DL had left hardcore supporters waiting on the next crop of prospects including: Joey Votto, Jay Bruce, and Johnny Cueto. The bandbox ballpark they had just built, to accommodate Griffey Jr. in his pursuit of Aaron’s career HR record, hurt their development of starting pitchers and outfield defense.
Despite all that, things started looking up for the Reds when they acquired perennial Devil Rays prospect Josh Hamilton from the Cubs in 2007, who hit .292/.368/.554 in 90 games in CF for Cincinnati. Reds management didn’t recognize what they had, and dealt Hamilton to Texas in the off-season for Edinson Volquez; where Josh became a 5-time All-Star, AL MVP, and helped the Rangers win two pennants.
To complete the 2007-08 off-season double-disaster, the Reds also brought in Dusty Baker to be their manager. Dusty Baker’s low-OBP, small-ball, “aggressive” style has long been been a losing strategy in MLB– even since his playing days in the 1970’s.
Dusty is also notorious as a wrecker of pitchers (see Mark Prior, Kerry Wood, Jason Schmidt, Russ Ortiz), managing the SF Giants from 1993-2002, all with superstar Barry Bonds; winning his only pennant in 2002. The Giants were set to win it all, until the 7th inning of Game 6, when the Giants suffered one of the worst meltdowns in World Series history. [collapse starts at 2:15 in the video]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AB-mFRKQBQE
* Barry Bonds was the real MVP of the 2002 World Series
After losing the heart-breaker shown above, and then Game 7 the following night; the Giants didn’t renew Baker’s contract. Cubs GM Jim Hendry signed Baker to manage the Northsiders. Dusty’s reign ended ignominiously when star RF Sammy Sosa & Baker both mishandled game situations & criticism, wearing out their welcome in Chicago. Wrigley Field normally has the most optimistic, soft-hearted & forgiving fans in baseball; but a majority of Cubs fans had little affection for Baker’s brusque style by the end of his tenure in 2006.
Baker’s problems have always included: not trusting younger players; overemphasis on small-ball tactics; bullpen management; and of course– abusing his starting pitchers. He, like many old-school ballplayers, refuses to understand the value of sabermetrics, statistical analysis, medical science, etc; and is therefore ill-equipped to manage a MLB team in this era.
The video above, from the infamous ‘Steve Bartman’ game, is vintage Dusty Baker; staying with his young stud starter too long (119 pitches), while his team falls apart fundamentally. He ceaseless fidgets his toothpick throughout. Mark Prior was never the same after this outing, as his promising career was cut short by rotator cuff injuries.
Dusty Baker: Cincinnati Reds Manager 2008-13
Bad decisions don’t win, and the Dusty Baker-managed Cincinnati Reds of 2008-13 confirmed that theory; as he never won much in Cincinnati, even though he had talented players with an owner willing to spend.
Still a lifelong Reds fan through 2007, it no longer made sense to let myself be held hostage to the short-sightedness of professional nitwits. I simply did what any reasonable, non-masochistic baseball fan would do– pick a new favorite team.
Enter the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, who were the joke of MLB from their inception in 1998, until Stuart Sternberg acquired controlling interest of the team from Vince Naimoli in 2005. From there the TB Devil Rays invested in sabermetric scouting & evaluation, with much-improved player development; quickly putting together an enviable farm system, even as they were still perennially finishing last.
They changed the franchise name to the Tampa Bay Rays for the 2008 season, just as their prospects were maturing; and to the complete surprise of most, won the AL pennant in 2008. It looked like the beginning of many trips to the fall classic, with a roster full of young talent and another top draft pick to come.
Under GM Andrew Friedman and savvy manager Joe Maddon, the Rays competed with the high-payroll Yankees & Red Sox for six seasons on sheer hard work, brains and a shoestring budget; until it finally snapped on July 31, 2014 when the Rays dealt LHP David Price (the best pitcher they’ll ever have, with another year of arbitration remaining), to the Detroit Tigers for prospects.
In the 2014-15 off-season; RF Wil Myers, 2B Ben Zobrist, and OF Matt Joyce (all championship-level players with team-friendly contracts) were jettisoned for no good reason. A return to the World Series for the Rays was never-to-be, as poor drafts & stunted player development ended the talent pipeline. Ownership’s refusal to invest in talent eventually whittled the short-stacked Rays into the AL East fodder they are today.
Now, everything with the Rays centers on getting the taxpayers to build them a new stadium. Tropicana Field was designed by original owner Vince Naimoli. It is a charmless domed stadium located at the end of a peninsula, making it poorly accessible to most of the Tampa-St. Petersburg population. It rightfully stands as a monument of Floridian thoughtlessness & greed, with the TB Rays locked into a 30-year lease through 2027. Rays fans are annually bombarded with veiled threats from ownership to move, if the taxpayers don’t pitch in. [1]
Stuart Sternberg in a 2011Tampa Tribune interview said, “Every year that goes by increases the possibility that we won’t be here. If there is something inevitable, you have to deal with it. At some point, my partners in baseball are going to throw their hands up in the air and say, ‘enough is enough.’” [2]
A baseball fan’s advice to Stu Sternberg who is worth an estimated $800 million [3]: try keeping your best players, and fill in on-the-field needs with (at least) mid-level contracts. If you always punt on C, 1B, DH, and LF; then you don’t score enough runs for your awesome pitching staff. That’s how you piss away chance after chance to win it all, with 70-80% of the talent already there.
The Rays revolutionized team defense, proving Defensive Efficiency Rating (the percentage of batted balls in play, minus home runs, converted into outs) and other defensive sabermetrics to be superior in comparison to traditional defense metrics (errors, assists, put-outs, etc). Advanced metrics show the Rays defense at their peak (CF BJ Upton/ LF Carl Crawford era) was historically great.
Rays ownership & front office consistently played for tomorrow with arbitration eligibility, holding back its best prospects (even when they were desperately needed [see Desmond Jennings, Wil Myers]), in order to extend their peak seasons before free agency. Many players rightfully resented those tactics (see Upton & Crawford for sure), and considering the talent the Rays organization had, it seems a shame the front office never was allowed to value winning ahead of cost savings & revenue projections.
The Rays consistently had one of the lowest payrolls in MLB ($40-70 million), while competing in the AL East against the NY Yankees & BOS Red Sox, both in the $140-220 million range. Their pitching staff, along with their defense, was the best in baseball. Nobody put together & managed a bullpen better than Joe Maddon. What the Rays needed was another $15-20 million, well-spent on bats; but ownership would never approve it. That will be the sad, but enduring legacy of the 2008-14 Tampa Bay Rays.
For me, the Rays and their remaining hardcore fans will suffer on their own– with the assurance that winning is but a distant memory. Outside of 3B Evan Longoria (signed to a ridiculously low long-term deal), most of their winning talent is now somewhere else– or on the DL. Their championship window was carelessly squandered, by an ownership that refused to care for its product on the field, because it really only cares about getting itself a new field.
The point of all this is: why support teams that run themselves poorly? Why should fans be loyal to teams that don’t invest in themselves? One solution is to become a free agent fan, and choose an organization that runs itself well; that proves it wants to win by building from within, while spending (& dealing) wisely. Those are qualities a baseball fan can admire and get behind.
This free agent fan chooses the San Diego Padres as his favorite MLB team in 2015. I’ve never seen much of the Padres, but I like the moves they’ve made in the off-season. They play in a pitcher’s park (cool), and newly-acquired RHP James Shields was my favorite player with TB. He joins Wil Myers (the guy he was dealt to KC for), so I’m in on the Padres. BJ Upton is also in the mix, so no West-coast bias here. Matt Kemp is a great player, and his health is key.
The Lowdown: the Padres are trying to compete against the defending world champion SF Giants (who haven’t repeated in their run), and the sky high-payroll LA Dodgers in the NL West. Rockies & Diamondbacks are considered to be second division clubs, until proven otherwise. Padres have upped their payroll to $108 million in order to take a shot.
The new format of two wild-cards helps their chances. As always in baseball, you never know how it will turn out, but at least 2015 Padres fans can feel like their team has committed itself to winning.
Think in terms of winning value & money spent, and see you in October. Good judgement in those areas are all a baseball fan can expect from management & ownership under capitalism.
I’ve seen most of them on Netflix (as linked), and the overall quality varies from excellent to pointless [see No Mas (2013) for an example of the latter]. Top films include:
Of Miracles and Men (2015) Puts Miracle (2004) to shame; the Sofia Loren analogy by the Soviet/Russian journalist is perfect in precision.
The Two Escobars (2010) Searing documentary of the Columbian national futbol team, and it’s elegant defenseman Andres Escobar; trying to compete at the 1994 World Cup during the US-sponsored Plan Columbia operation– a military & CIA war for control of the Medellin drug cartel led by Pablo Escobar.
Pony Excess (2010) Before the U, there was SMU; Eric Dickerson is the prototype too-cool-for-school athlete in this wild west football saga.
The U (2010) Most productive football factory ever; Billy Corben = excellent filmmaker.
Small Potatoes: Who Killed the USFL? (2009) Answer: Donald Trump. Updated 7/11/15: Trump is now seeking the Republican nomination for president of the United States.
Slaying the Badger (2014) The story of Europeans v. lone American Greg LeMond (& his wife), at le tour de France, before widespread doping in professional cycling.
Jordan Rides the Bus (2010) Mighta been a big-leaguer…the MLB strike of 1994 was crucial…as Annie Savoy said in Bull Durham (1988)– “timing is everything.”
9.79* (2012) As it turns out, Carl Lewis wasn’t any cleaner.
Catching Hell (2011) No fan deserves to be put in Steve Bartman’s situation.
Broke (2012) Roughly 80% of professional athletes, five years after retiring: Billy Corben directs.
Big Shot (2014) Venture capitalist bluffs everybody, and almost pulls it off; happens everyday on Wall Street (and around the world), in every industry. Updated 7/11/15: this guy just went to prison again, for embezzlement.
Rand University (2014) The greatest NFL wide receiver of all-time was Jerry Rice; Randy Moss is second on that list.
Free Spirits (2014) The ABA was a crazy league, and the NBA is still paying for it. Updated 7/11/15: the NBA finally settled with the former owners of the St. Louis Spirits.
The Real Rocky (2011) Sly Stallone was eventually sued, and settled out-of-court for an undisclosed amount with Chuck Wepner; whose story is more fascinating than any Rocky movie.
Playing for the Mob (2014) Goodfellas (1990) is more fascinating in real-life too, Ray Liotta narrates.
Brian & the Boz (2014) He finally grew up, throwing off his BS persona; similar to The Marinovich Project (ESPN 2011), which was also well done– maybe even better.
The Dotted Line (2011) Morgan Spurlock examines professional sports agency; been a fan since Super Size Me (2004).
Brothers in Exile (2014) Livan & Orlando “El Duque” Hernandez, from Cuba to MLB; once again, more gripping & compelling than any Hollywood dramatized production of these stories.
Marquette University is a private Jesuit institution located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; named after French Jesuit missionary Jacques Marquette (1637–1675).
It was established by the Society of Jesus, and was founded by the first Bishop of Milwaukee, John Martin Henni in 1881.
Established as an all-male institution, Marquette became the first co-ed Catholic university in the world in 1909.
Today, Milwaukee’s Marquette high school is the location of the original Marquette College.
Marquette College moved downtown in 1907, becoming Marquette University.
Marquette high school in Milwaukee is nicknamed the Hilltoppers.
From 1954-1994, Marquette University was nicknamed the Warriors.
Marquette is recognized as a basketball school.
The images of Al McGuire crying as he’s coaching his last game, a victory in the 1977 NCAA championship game, forever cemented that legacy.
It’s most famous hoops alums include Glenn “Doc” Rivers, William Gates and Dwyane Wade.
Side-note 1: This author went to Marquette from 1987-94, when Kevin O’Neill became MU basketball’s savior hero. O’Neill was a Lute Olson (Arizona) protege, who became MU’s head coach, rescuing it from its Bob Dukiet nadir (1986-89). He got little respect from the media and alumni, because he wasn’t Al McGuire, which is ridiculous; so he left for a better college job and ended up in the NBA, where he belonged. Kevin O”Neill is an excellent basketball coach, and a great recruiter who is also smart/funny with the media. He just needed a fair shot in the NBA, which he never got. He fulfils the promise he makes to William Gates in Hoop Dreams(1994). O’Neill, as of this writing, is back in college; head coach of the USC Trojans.
Marquette’s pre-1954 nicknames included the Hilltoppers, Blue & Gold, and Golden Avalanche for football– until the pigskin program was cancelled at the end of the 1960 season.
A huge problem for Marquette football was their stadium, which still partially exists and is used for intramural flag & club football. Marquette Stadium (1924–1960) is a 20-block walk from campus; located at 36th & Clybourne– a drug-infested, gang-banging neighborhood.
It’s capacity was 24,000 at its peak; and thus never suitable for “big-time” college football.
In the late 1950’s, university trustees cut a deal with city & county officials allowing the Marquette Golden Avalanche to play in Milwaukee Stadium (later renamed County Stadium), the home of the MLB Milwaukee Braves & part-time home of the NFL’s Green Bay Packers.
Unfortunately, the Golden Avalanche could never approach filling Milwaukee Stadium, or even put a competitive team on the field, since its early heyday in the 1920’s & 30’s.
Their last winning season was in 1953; after that Marquette went 10-44-3, until the program was terminated in a shoddy manner, after the 1960 season due to annual $50,000+ deficits.
After being given every chance to succeed, MU announced the cancellation its football program on December 9, 1960.
Despite an initial ruckus by hooligan students, football died a quiet death at Marquette; continuing a trend for Catholic schools of that era.
In 1961, it was proposed by a group of students, for the Marquette Warriors men’s basketball team to establish a mascot.
The Marquette Tribune reported on Oct. 28, 1960, the Student Senate passed a motion to form a committee for a Warrior caricature.
In February of 1961, the name of Willie Wampum was chosen as the winner of the “Name the Warrior” contest.
Willie Wampum made his first appearance at a Marquette basketball game on February 24, 1961.
Willie Wampum, the Marquette Warriors mascot from 1961-71
Bill Schatz, a cheerleader for Marquette was the first to wear the Willie Wampum costume; made by his sister, Mary Ann Schatz Loucks.
She stated, “My vision came from the Milwaukee Braves mascot.”
Does this honor another culture, or is it just demented?
Willie Wampum was the Marquette University Warriors mascot until the Student Senate requested that the administration retire his character in 1971.
Willie Wampum in Full Costume
—————————————————————-
Mark Denning is one of the most familiar faces in the modern history of Marquette University, yet few Marquette alumni have any idea who he is?
Denning is a Native American MU alum, and the original “First Warrior” at Marquette basketball games in the early 1980s.
The Marquette Warriors logo from the early 1980’s – 1994, is the likeness of Mark Denning
Mark Denning, dressed as Marquette’s “First Warrior”
Official MU memorandum states that “the First Warrior was selected in the late 1970s to be a symbol of Marquette’s relationship with Indians and to visualize the university’s commitment.”
Reality was different, as the First Warrior’s refusal to clown the crowd with stereotypical antics, failed to rally Marquette basketball fans.
The “First Warrior” was abandoned after the 1986-87 season, when Native American students no longer participated.
In the fall semester of 1993, MU trustees announced that the Warriors nickname was to be discontinued, and Marquette University was accepting submissions for a new nickname.
Protests & pressure from Native American groups and their sympathizers had compelled the university to make a clean break with past abuses, including ignorant disrespect for Indian culture.
A list of two choices was presented to the student body for a “vote”: Golden Eagles vs. Lightning.
It wasn’t much of a choice, and most students abstained; Golden Eagles won by a two-to-one margin.
In May of 1994, the last Warriors class graduated from Marquette University.
Side-note 2: Marquette University School of Dentistry opened on September 26, 1894. It is the only dental school in Wisconsin. Marquette School of Dentistry currently enrolls 100 freshmen each year, 50 Wisconsin residents and 50 non-residents. Today, these are the estimated annual costs for a full-time MU dental student.
As a graduate of Marquette University’s School of Dentistry in 1994, this author still maintains abandoning the Warriors nickname was a step ahead.
Attempts to revive the Warriors nickname have met with no more success, than those who attempt to bring NCAA football back to MU.
In 2005, the MU Board of Trustees unilaterally announced the changing of Marquette’s nickname to the Gold.
The Marquette Gold lasted only one week, but it revived the Warriors nickname lobby.
A huge campaign was waged, and another “vote” was put to the students; Golden Eagles vs Hilltoppers– any write-ins for Warriors would not be officially tabulated.
Golden Eagles won again in a landslide, as the university students & alumni preferred their own nickname, over that of Milwaukee’s Marquette high school.
Overall it was a colossal waste of time and resources, in a reactionary effort to turn back society’s clock.
End Note: We don’t need no stinking nicknames– We are Marquette.
Marquette Alumni Comments & Responses
MS: Well said !!!! I am still a Warrior !!!! No matter what Marquette University says.
BC: I just really dislike the nickname “Golden Eagles”. Its very generic, and not unique, as other schools have already claimed that nickname. I would love to have Warriors back, without the Native American Indian associations, but too much damage was done in the 60’s and 70’s. I can vividly remember watching and laughing hysterically as a little boy as the Marquette Indian mascot danced around to the Hamms beer song on TV, during a timeout. It ain’t so funny now……..Unfortunately, it is exactly this imagery, that is preventing us from losing the Indian association with the name “Warrior”. Truly a shame.
RS: The comments above are nearly 100% how I felt before I started writing this piece yesterday. But while writing I realized that Marquette is unique, in the way it cast off its beloved nickname and moved forward. It hurt (and still hurts), but it was necessary because the abuses were much greater. Today the institution & its alumni stand taller for it. Also notice how the adoption of the Willie Wampum mascot in early 1961, coincided with the cancellation of football at MU in late 1960–as that brand of chauvinism always reincarnates itself.
MP: Well written. I think they should have kept the Warrior name but dropped all mascots and images of American Indians. A la Golden State Warriors. I never liked the Golden Eagles name and I still only buy MU clothing that does not have Golden Eagles on it. I agree that Willie Wampum was not a good choice but the name Warrior could have been maintained without offending anyone – every society respects the concept of a warrior.
RS: I agree with this, but only under the condition that EVERYONE respects Indian heritage, which obviously isn’t the case; as Native Americans who live on reservations, live in squalor. It needs to be strictly understood that European forefathers massacred Indian forefathers, and that reparations still haven’t been made. Not even close. The answer to the title of this piece is history. Once true understanding becomes part of our society, only then can the name Warriors be restored to Marquette.
